|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Zionist collaboration with the Nazis (1)A review by Shraga Elam (2)23 November 2003 There are few issues as sensitive as the collaboration between segments of the Zionist movement and the Nazis. The strong taboo on this subject makes it very difficult to conduct factual debate and research on the topic. Lenni Brenner, with his important book, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (Lawrence Hill, 1983), belongs to the radical critics of the dominant and strongly religious (Judaeo-Christian) interpretation of the Nazi era. With his newest book (3), Brenner aims to further the factual debate by publishing some of the documents that he used in his earlier book. Brenner recommends that the uninformed reader, who might desire more than the brief comments provided for each document, consult his other books - Zionism in the Age of the Dictators and The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (Zed Books, 1984 - for a "detailed amplification of the material" (p. xi). The value of Brenner's compilation is diminished by the absence of more relevant documents, partly cited in more recent studies. Therefore, this book does not reflect in many instances the latest body of knowledge and cannot replace the necessary systematic study of information that has become accessible since Brenner's original research. A relevant example is the Kasztner affair, which provides one of the most controversial instances of collaboration by the Jewish Agency (JA) with the Nazis. Rudolf Kasztner was the leader of a Zionist rescue committee in Budapest that negotiated the fate of Hungarian Jewry with the Nazis in 1944-45. For Kasztner's opponents, including Brenner, these negotiations were just a cover-up for Nazi collaboration. In this framework, according to eyewitnesses, the Kasztner group helped the SS deport Jews to Auschwitz. Kastzner's defenders argue that he truly believed that there existed a genuine chance to rescue the Hungarian Jews. The study of various publications and documents shows that the main problem was not Kasztner, but rather the JA leadership, which, along with the Allies, sabotaged a very real opportunity for rescuing the Hungarian Jews. The JA did not tell Kasztner to cease dealing with the Nazis, and he obviously saw no other choice but to sacrifice a few Jews while still hoping to save a much greater number. This interpretation not only is supported by the facts, but it also supplies a more political explanation for the affair. It also clarifies better the reasons for the assassination of Kasztner in 1957 by a "former" Shin Bet agent. After losing a libel trial stemming from accusations of his collaboration made by a Hungarian Jewish survivor of the Nazi Holocaust, Kasztner was under heavy pressure to defend himself, but the Israeli government was afraid that he might expose the truth. Furthermore, as Shoshana Eshoni-Beri makes clear in a Hebrew article ("The Kastner Affair", published in Yalkut Moreshet, No. 59, April 1995), the JA sent Kasztner in 1948 to testify in Nuremburg in favour of three Nazi war criminals. The pragmatic Zionist leadership saved these criminals, responsible for murdering Jews, because they were ready to pay ransom payments to spare their own lives. As I demonstrate in my German book, Hitler's Forgers (Uberreuter Verlag, 2000), Swiss documents prove that one of these Nazis ordered his Swiss trustee to transfer money to the JA in Geneva (p. 70). A similar JA policy also is reflected in the case of an important Jewish Nazi agent, Jaac van Harten, who was given refuge in Tel Aviv in 1947 by Golda Meir and Israeli secret agents (see Hitler's Forgers and Ha'aretz, 28 April and 19 May 2000). Brenner believes that similarities between the Nazi and Zionist ideologies were the main reason for the collaboration, and many of his readers tend to overestimate this resemblance. But they should not forget that all nationalist ideologies possess in various degrees traits like Blut und Boden (blood and soil). Therefore, resemblances among many nationalist movements are not surprising. In addition, persecuted people tend to internalize the attitudes of their oppressors, as the famous psychoanalyst Franz Fanon argued in his book The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1965). The Zionist-Nazi cooperation was in fact based less on common ideology and more on common interests: both movements, for different reasons, worked towards removing the Jews from Europe. This was the main reason for the Transfer Agreement of the 1930s, which established the JA as the general importer of German goods in the Middle East and helped the JA to cope with an economic crisis. A study of JA policy during the Nazi era supports the position that, had Zionism not been preoccupied with building a Jewish state as its overriding goal, more Jews would have been rescued. The JA saved Jews only when it served its national goals. When the rescue efforts were against the national interests, like at the Evian Conference in 1938, they were sabotaged. According to documents quoted by the Israeli researcher S. B. Beit-Zwi in Post-Ugandan Zionism on Trial (Zahala, 1991) and partly addressed by Brenner in his first book, the JA leadership saw a great danger for the Zionist project if Jewish refugees were to go to any destination other than Palestine. In other circumstances, like the Transfer Agreement or the van Harten affair, the JA helped and protected the Nazis. The lessons from the JA's dubious role are valid for all national movements. This leadership acted generally against the interests of the threatened Jews. Therefore, it always should be asked: in whose interests and at what costs is a "nation liberated?" Who profits from it and who loses? (1) This review is published in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Volume 129, Number 1, Fall 2003. (2) Shraga Elam is an Israeli investigative journalist based in Zurich and author of a highly-praised book in German on the collaboration of the Zionist leadership with the Nazis. The book, Hitlers Faelscher: wie juedische amerikanische und Schweizer Agenten der SS beim Falschgeldwaschen halfen [Hitler's Forgers: How Jewish, American and Swiss agents helped the SS with laundering faked money], is published by Uberreuter Verlag and can be purchased here. (3) Lenni Brenner (ed.), Fifty-One Documents: Zionist Collaboration with the Nazis (Barricade Books, Fort Lee, NJ, 2002) xii +326 pages. Glossary to p. 335. Index to p. 342. .00 cloth Copyright © Redress Information & Analysis. All rights reserved. |